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INTRODUCTION
Legal advertising evokes controversy both inside and outside of the
legal profession. As the legal market has become increasingly
competitive, lawyers ranging from practitioners in large corporate law
firms to so-called "ambulance chasers" have taken full advantage of
their constitutional right to advertise In recent years, "ambulance
chasers" have been criticized for attempting to solicit accident victims
and their families in the immediate wake of a tragedy. While lawyer
advertising is protected speech under the First Amendment, many
critics argue that advertising harms the reputation of the legal profes-
sion and invades the privacy of victims.' Proponents assert that
direct-mail advertising is a vital source of information for victims who
otherwise would not have access to the legal system.4 Over the past
two decades, as state and local bar associations have placed restric-
tions on lawyer solicitation, the Supreme Court has struggled with the
balance between an attorney's First Amendment right to advertise and
accident victims' right to privacy.5
1. The term "ambulance chasing" is frequently used to describe "the practice of some
personal injury lawyers [of] aggressively seek[ing] out potential clients in the wake of fires,
collisions, and other disasters." L. Anita Richardson, Stopping the Chas 81 A.B.A.J.,Jan. 1995,
at 38; see Linda Greenhouse, At the Bar, N.Y. TIMEs, June 23, 1995, at A23 (observing that not
only "ambulance chasers" advertise, but so do law firms that target potential clients through
newsletters and announcements); see also David G. Savage, Supreme Court Upholds Lawyer
Solicitation Curbs, LA. TIMES,June 22, 1995, at A4 (maintaining that, in recent years, lawyers have
become overzealous in advertising).
2. See Scavenger Lawyers, MIAMI HERALD, Sept. 29, 1987, at 22A (criticizing lawyers who
solicit accident victims); Solicitors Out of Bounds, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Oct. 26, 1987, at 12A
(asserting that Florida lawyers send targeted direct mail to victims shortly after accidents).
3. See Robert D. Peltz, Legal Advertising-Opening Pandora's Box, 19 STETSON L. REV. 43,
116 (1989) (providing list of Florida editorials criticizing direct-mail solicitation of accident
victims); Robert Habush, President's Page-The Image of Trial Lawyers, TRIAL, Dec. 1986, at 6
(observing that in 1980s, media coverage of Bhopal and widely publicized allegations of
international ambulance chasing exacerbated negative image of lawyers).
4. See Jeffrey S. Kinsler, Targeted, Direct-Mail Solicitation: Shapero v. Kentucky Bar
Association UnderAttack, 25 LoY. U. CHI. LJ. 1, 7 (1993) (discussing positive effect of direct-mail
solicitation, including promotion of consumer interest in "fullest possible dissemination of
commercial information," and advocating protection of attorney advertising).
5. Compare Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 642 (1985) (allowing
use of printed advertisements to target specific legal problems) and Bates v. State Bar of Ariz.,
433 U.S. 350, 383-84 (1977) (protecting truthful and non-misleading lawyer advertising) with In
re RMJ., 455 U.S. 191, 207 (1982) (upholding lawyers' right to advertise certain practice areas
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In Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc.,6 the Supreme Court upheld a
Florida Bar rule that prohibited personal injury lawyers from sending
direct-mail solicitations targeted to victims and their relatives within
thirty days of an accident or disaster.7 G. Stewart McHenry, a Florida
attorney, challenged the ban as a violation of the commercial speech
protection under the First Amendment.'
The Florida Bar, acting as the state regulatory body for lawyers,
adopted the restrictions in 1990 to curtail "ambulance chasing" that
might "further erode the public's faith in the legal system."9 The
restriction was also designed to protect the "personal privacy and
tranquility of accident victims and their relatives." ° Moreover, the
Florida Bar wanted to assure that potential clients would not be
pressured by attorneys who seek to attract new clients through "undue
influence or overreaching.""
The Court's decision in Went For It marked a dramatic change from
previous decisions on legal advertising. 2 In a five-to-four decision,
the Court rejected First Amendment protection of lawyer advertising
for the first time in almost two decades. 3 Although the impact of
Went For It is difficult to estimate, many observers predict that the case
could open the door for greater regulation of lawyer solicitation. 4
Several states have already adopted regulations restricting attorney
advertising, and a number of other states are considering whether to
pass similar regulations." Texas has even passed a law that makes
and bar memberships) and Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 467-68 (1978)
(upholding disciplinary action against lawyer soliciting prospective clients in hospital) and In re
Primus, 436 U.S. 412, 438-39 (1978) (prohibiting disciplinary action against lawyer seeking
clients for public interest class action).
6. 115 S. Ct. 2371 (1995).
7. Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 2371, 2381 (1995).
8. Id. at 2374.
9. See Lara Wozniak, Court Upholds Rule on Lawyer Solicitations, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES,June
22, 1995, at 1E (observing that Florida Bar originally wanted to ban all personal injury
solicitation but state supreme court found total ban too extreme and suggested waiting period
instead).
10. Went For It, 115 S. Ct. at 2374.
11. Id.
12. See Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Ass'n, 486 U.S. 466, 479 (1988) (holding that ban on
direct-mail advertising by attorneys is violation of First Amendment); Bates v. State Bar of Ariz.,
433 U.S. 350, 384 (1977) (allowing attorneys to utilize newspaper advertising for "routine legal
services").
13. Richard C. Reuben, Florida Bar's Ad Restfiction Constitutiona4 80 A.B.A.J., Aug. 1995, at
20.
14. See id. (speculating that while most experts agree Court's ruling was narrow and perhaps
limited to 30-day "cooling off" period, it may have greater impact on other restrictions);
Greenhouse, supra note 1, at A23 (noting that Went For It decision will make it easier for states
to implement regulations on lawyer solicitation).
15. See Greenhouse, supra note 1, at A23 (acknowledging that Texas, Iowa, and Mississippi
have "toughened up" their rules, and Illinois, Arizona, and Georgia are considering imposing
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targeted, direct-mail solicitation by attorneys a felony punishable by
up to ten years in prison. 16
In 1988, the Supreme Court held that states may not prohibit
lawyers from contacting potential clients through direct-mal solicita-
tion.' In 1995, however, Justice O'Connor's majority opinion in
Went For It reflects the Court's intention to scale back the amount of
First Amendment protection previously enjoyed by attorney advertis-
ing."8 Went For It represents a serious departure from prior Supreme
Court decisions, which limited the ability of the states to regulate
lawyer solicitation.19
This Note argues that the Supreme Court erred in Went For It by
limiting the First Amendment protection available to attorneys who
utilize direct-mail advertising. Part I contains a brief history of
commercial free speech under the First Amendment. Part II provides
an overview of Went For It, including a procedural history. Part III
analyzes whether the Court correctly applied the Central Hudson test,
the standard used by the Court in commercial speech cases since
1980. Finally, Part IV suggests that the Court has reduced the amount
of First Amendment protection available to attorneys by giving states
more ability to regulate commercial free speech.
I. CoMMERCIAL FREE SPEECH UNDER THE FIRST AMENDMENT
A. The Supreme Court and Commercial Free Speech
Prior to its 1976 decision in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v.
Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.,2" the Supreme Court had held
regulations); Linda Greenhouse, High Court Backs Florida Restriction on Solicitation of Accident
Victims by Laugers, N.Y. TiMES,June 21, 1995, at A22 (observing that New York and Connecticut
have restrictions barring mail solicitation to people whose physical or mental health may hinder
them in exercising reasonable judgment when hiring lawyers).
16. See TEx. PENAL CODE § 38.12(D) (2) (a) (West 1993) (making it felony to send targeted
direct-mail solicitation for personal injury or wrongful death to victim or victim's family within
30 days of accident); see also Mark Hansen, Texas Makes Solicitation a Felony, 79 A.B.A J., Sept.
1993, at 32 (commenting on Texas law that also restricts written solicitations by prospective
lawyers and other professionals within 30 days of lawsuit, accident, or arrest).
17. See Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Ass'n, 486 U.S. 466, 468 (1988) (maintaining that, under
First Amendment, state may not prohibit lawyers from soliciting business by sending "truthful
and nondeceptive letters to potential clients known to face particular legal problems"); see also
Richardson, supra note 1, at 38 (noting that written solicitation by lawyers has received
significant protection from Supreme Court).
18. See Went For It, 115 S. Ct. at 2375 (emphasizing that Court affords commercial speech
lesser degree of protection than other First Amendment speech).
19. See Richardson, supra note 1, at 38 (explaining that Florida Bar asked Supreme Court
to overrule its earlier decisions); Marcia Coyle, Ad Decision Could Spur a Rollback, NAT'L LJ.,July
3, 1995, at Al (asserting that prior to Went For It, states had been allowed to regulate advertising
only to prevent false and misleading communications or to ban in-person solicitation).
20. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
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that the First Amendment offered little protection for commercial
speech. In that landmark case, the Supreme Court struck down a
Virginia statute preventing pharmacists from advertising drug
prices.22 The Court held for the first time that the First Amendment
protected purely commercial speech and that consumers have a
strong interest in the free flow of commercial information. 2' The
Court, however, did not enunciate a standard for First Amendment
protection and limited its holding to commercial speech that is
truthful and non-deceptive to the consumer.24
The Court articulated a standard for commercial speech protection
four years later in Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service
Commission.25  In Central Hudson, the Court examined the constitu-
tionality of a state restriction prohibiting electric utilities from
advertising.26 While the Court found that the Constitution provides
lesser protection to commercial speech than to other forms of
protected expression,27 the Court nonetheless held that the adver-
tisements served an informational function and required some First
Amendment protection.2 8 The Court developed a four-part analysis
to determine whether restrictions on commercial free speech violate
the First Amendment.29
Under Central Hudson, the threshold inquiry is whether the speech
concerns lawful activity and is not misleading." Once this element
21. See Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 55 (1942) (prohibiting distribution of
handbills on New York city streets as violation of New York Sanitary Code); Jerry Elliott,
Comment, The First Amendment, In Re R.M.J., and State Regulation of Direct Mail Lawyer Advertising,
34 BAYLOR L. REv. 411, 414-18 (1982) (providing overview of commercial speech doctrine); cf
Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 54 (1942) (upholding ban on street distribution of
advertising notices and observing that Constitution imposes no restraint on government when
regulating commercial advertising). Valentinewas the standard on commercial advertising until
the Court granted First Amendment protection in Virginia Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia
Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 770 (1976). SeeJeffrey M. Brandt, Note, Attorney
In-Person Solicitation: Hope for a New Direction and Supreme Court Protection After Edenfield v. Fane,
25 U. TOL L. REv. 783, 786 n.27 (1994) (providing overview of commercial speech prior to
Virginia Pharmacy decision in 1976).
22. Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 773.
23. Id. at 765; see also Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 826 (1975) (recognizing for first
time that commercial information is important to efficient exchange of resources in free
market).
24. Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 773.
25. 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
26. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 558 (1980).
27. Id. at 562-63.
28. See id. at 562 (recognizing that even when advertising communicates only incomplete
version of relevant facts, First Amendment presumes that some accurate information is better
than none at all).
29. Id. at 566; see also infra notes 30-31 and accompanying text (presenting Central Hudson's
four-part test).
30. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566. If the commercial speech concerns unlawful activities
or is misleading, it will not be entitled to constitutional protection. Id. at 566 n.9; see Shapero
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is satisfied, the Court then analyzes the restriction under a three-
prong test: (1) the purported government interest must be substan-
tial; (2) the government must demonstrate that the restriction on
commercial speech directly and materially advances its interest; and
(3) the regulation must not be more extensive than is necessary to
serve that interest.3 Relying on this test, the Court in Central Hudson
struck down restrictions on promotional advertising by New York
electric companies because the restrictions were not narrowly tailored
to the government's interests.3 2  The Court found that the restric-
tions reached all promotional advertising, regardless of the impact on
overall energy use.33 In addition, no showing was made that a more
limited restriction on the content of promotional advertising would
adequately serve the state's interests.' 4 Since 1980, the Court has
consistently utilized the Central Hudson standard in all commercial
speech cases.3 5
In 1993, the Court used the Central Hudson test to strike down a
Florida regulation on solicitation by certified public accountants
(CPAs)."6 In Edenfield v. Fane,37 a commercial speech restriction
precluded accountants from soliciting potential business clients by
telephone even though the information conveyed was truthful and
v. Kentucky Bar Ass'n, 486 U.S. 466, 485 (1988) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (explaining
standardized test used to determine constitutional protection of commercial speech).
31. CentralHudson, 447 U.S. at 566; see also id. at 565 (explaining that "regulatory technique
may extend only as far as the interest it serves"). The test for commercial speech articulated by
the Court in Central Hudson is not to be confused with the analysis used in Fourteenth
Amendment equal protection cases. As Justice Scalia pointed out in Board of Trustees, State
University of N.Y. v. Fox, the test for commercial speech is much less permissive of government
regulation than the Fourteenth Amendment rational basis test. 492 U.S. 469, 480 (1989).
32. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566-67. In Central Hudson, the Court found that the state's
interest in energy conservation did notjustify the suppression of all promotional advertising by
public utilities. Id at 570. The Court noted that the ban on advertising prevented Central
Hudson from promoting its products that decreased energy consumption, thus directly
conflicting with the state's interest. Id. at 570-71.
33. Id. at 570.
34. Id.
35. See Brandt, supra note 21, at 789 n.44 (asserting that all commercial speech cases after
Central Hudson have utilized that test); see, e.g., Edenfield v. Fane, 113 S. Ct. 1792 (1993) (using
Central Hudson test to evaluate Florida Rule governing solicitation by certified public
accountants); Peel v. Attorney Regulation & Disciplinary Comm'n, 496 U.S. 91, 101 (1990)
(analyzing lawyers' use of designation in advertisement under Central Hudson); Shapero v.
Kentucky Bar Ass'n, 486 U.S. 466, 472 (1988) (weighing restriction on direct-mail advertising
under Central Hudson); Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 647 (1985)
(analyzing targeted newspaper advertisement under Central Hudson test); In re R.MJ., 455 U.S.
191, 203 (1982) (balancing Central Hudson factors in determining whether prohibition on
attorney advertisement was constitutional); see also Went For I 115 S. Ct. at 2375-76 (analyzing
restrictions on commercial speech under Central Hudson framework).
36. Edenfied, 507 U.S. at 767.
37. 507 U.S. 761 (1993).
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non-deceptive.' The Court in Edenfield found that Florida had a
substantial interest in protecting consumers from fraud and maintain-
ing standards of ethical conduct for licensed professions. 9 The
Court found that the restriction on solicitation failed to satisfy the
second prong of the analysis, however, because it did not "directly
advance the state interest involved."' ° The Court reasoned that part
of the restriction's shortcoming was due to Florida's failure to present
studies suggesting that personal solicitation of prospective business
clients by accountants creates dangers of fraud or overreaching. 41
Thus, the Court held that, because the regulation did not advance
Florida's interest, it unconstitutionally suppressed legitimate commer-
cial speech.42
B. The Supreme Court and Legal Advertising
A year after the Supreme Court allowed pharmacist advertising in
Virginia Pharmacy, it extended the same commercial free speech
protection to lawyer advertising in Bates v. State Bar of Arizona.43 In
Bates, the state bar disciplined attorneys for advertising their legal
clinic in a local newspaper in violation of an Arizona Bar rule
prohibiting attorney advertising.' In striking down the restriction,
the Court held that states could no longer absolutely prohibit
attorneys from advertising.' The Court reasoned that even though
advertising should not be a client's only basis for selecting an
attorney, advertising provides useful information that may enable a
client to make a more informed decision.46 While Bates opened the
door to permissible attorney advertising, its precise holding was
limited to routine legal services, resulting in additional litigation over
attorney solicitation.47
38. Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 764-65 (1993).
39. Md at 770.
40. Id. at 770-71; see also id at 770 (articulating penultimate prong of CentralHudson, which
requires that regulation impinging upon commercial expression "'may not be sustained if it
provides only ineffective or remote support for the government's purpose'" (quoting Central
Hudson, 447 U.S. at 564)).
41. ML The Court maintained that the Florida Board of Accountancy failed to provide any
anecdotal evidence to validate the Board's suppositions about fraud or overreaching. Id.
42. Id at 777.
43. 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
44. Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 354-56 (1977).
45. See id at 383-84 (maintaining that only false, deceptive, or misleading lawyer advertising
is subject to restraint).
46. See i& at 375-76 (explaining that advertising is "the traditional mechanism in a free-
market economy for a supplier to inform a potential purchaser of the availability and terms of
exchange").
47. See Peltz, supra note 3, at 50 (commenting that Court was careful to limit holding to
issue of"whether lawyers... may constitutionally advertise the prices at which certain routine
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The Court attempted to define the scope of constitutionally accept-
able restrictions on attorney advertising in Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar
Ass'n.4" In Ohralik, the Ohio State Bar brought disciplinary proceed-
ings against an attorney because he personally solicited accident
victims who he sought to represent on a contingent fee basis. 49 In
Ohralik, the Supreme Court permitted restrictions on lawyer advertis-
ing and distinguished Bates because the potential for overreaching in
a face-to-face encounter was greater than in a public advertisement for
legal services.5" The Court reasoned that unlike a public advertise-
ment that provides information and gives the recipient time to think
about responding, in-person solicitation may "exert pressure and often
demands an immediate response," with no time for reflection.5' The
Court suggested that the need to restrict attorneys from in-person
solicitation was perhaps greater than the need to restrict other profes-
sions because lawyers' persuasive skills enhance their ability to
convince potential clients that a lawyer's services are needed.52
Finding that the nature of the state's interest differed from that in
Ohralik, in In re Primus,5  the Court sought to further define the
scope of permissible restrictions on lawyer advertising. The Court in
Primus struck down a South Carolina restriction and held that a non-
profit organization, the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU),
could use direct-mail advertising to solicit prospective litigants."
The Court reasoned that, unlike the political speech at issue in
Pimus, Ohralik involved in-person solicitation for pecuniary gain.55
services will be performed" (citing Bates, 433 U.S. at 367-68)).
48. 436 U.S. 447 (1978).
49. Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 450-51 (1978). The attorney had one
accident victim sign a contingency fee agreement during a visit to her hospital room as she lay
in traction. Id. at 450. He then visited the other accident victim at her home, without
invitation, and persuaded her to enter into a similar agreement. Id. at 451.
50. See id. at 457 (contending that, unlike public advertisement that provides information
and gives recipient time to think about responding, in-person solicitation may "exert pressure
and often demands an immediate response," with no time for reflection).
51. Id
52. See id. at 465 (explaining that unsophisticated, injured, or distressed laypeople may place
trust in lawyer "in response to persuasion under circumstances conducive to uninformed acquies-
cence").
53. 436 U.S. 412 (1978). In Primus, a South Carolina lawyer, cooperating with a branch of
the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), sent a follow-up letter to a woman who had been
sterilized as a condition of receiving public assistance. ld. at 415. This woman had participated
in a group discussion that the lawyer, invited by the ACLU, had led. Id. The letter addressed
the legal rights relating to the woman's sterilization and informed her that the ACLU would
represent her pro bono in a lawsuit against the doctor who had performed the sterilization. Id.
at 416 & n.6. The Court distinguished this type of solicitation from that in Ohralik, where the
attorney stood to profit financially from solicitation of the potential client. IM. at 422.
54. Id. at 439.
55. I& at 434-36.
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The Court also emphasized that Primus involved mail solicitation
rather than face-to-face solicitation, as in Ohralik.5 6
In subsequent decisions concerning legal advertising, the Court has
generally narrowed the category of permissible bar association
restrictions.57 These cases have held that restrictions on attorneys
who utilize Yellow Pages, targeted newspaper advertisements,5 9
and attorney letterheads denoting legal specialization," violate the
First Amendment.61 All of these cases relied on the Central Hudson
test 2 to test the validity of a restriction on attorney commercial free
speech.63
In Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Assn, ' the Supreme Court first ad-
dressed whether the First Amendment protects direct-mail solicitation
56. Id. at 435-36.
57. See Kinsler, supra note 4, at 12 (commenting that Supreme Court continued to narrow
scope of permissible restrictions on lawyer advertising in 1980s).
58. In re R.MJ., 455 U.S. 191, 194, 206-08 (1982). In RM.J., the Supreme Court struck
down a prohibition on attorney advertisements that identified the jurisdictions where the
attorney was licensed as well as the areas of specialization. Id. at 196-97. Finding that the
speech was neither misleading nor deceptive, the Court applied the Central Hudson test. Id. at
203. Under the Central Hudson analysis, the Court held that the state failed to identify any
substantial interest in prohibiting lawyers from identifying the jurisdictions where they are
licensed to practice. Id. at 205.
59. Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 629 (1985). In Zauderer, the
attorney placed an advertisement in 36 Ohio newspapers, indicating his willingness to represent
women who had suffered injuries after using the Dalkon Shield contraceptive device. Id. at 630.
The Ohio Office of Disciplinary Counsel filed a complaint against Zauderer, alleging that his
advertisements violated Ohio Rule DR 2-103(A), which prohibited an attorney from
.recommending employment, as a private practitioner, of himself, his partner, or associate to
a non-lawyer who has not sought his advice regarding employment of a lawyer," and DR 2-
104(A), which prohibited a lawyer from accepting employment resulting from unsolicited advice
given to a person. Id. at 633. The Court held that application of these rules to Zauderer's
advertisement violated his First Amendment rights because the state failed to show that it had
a substantial interest in prohibiting truthful, non-deceptive advertising. Id. at 648-49.
60. Peel v. Attorney Registration & Disciplinary Comm'n, 496 U.S. 91, 94 (1990). In Peel,
disciplinary proceedings were brought against an attorney for violation of a rule prohibiting an
attorney from holding himself out as a civil trial specialist certified by the National Board of
Trial Advocacy. Id. at 97. The Court held that states may not ban a lawyer from advertising his
or her certification by a nationally recognized organization as a trial specialist, but that states
might consider requiring that disclaimers about the certifying organization accompany such an
advertisement. Id. at 110.
61. See Kinsler, supra note 4, at 14 (stating that Court's decisions in Bates, Ohralik, Primus,
R.M.J., and Zauderer demonstrate that states cannotplace "blanket prohibitions" on certain types
of attorney advertising).
62. SeeBoard of Trustees, State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469,473-81 (1989) (replacing
least restrictive means standard under Central Hudson test with requirement that regulation not
"'burden substantially more speech than is necessary to further the government's legitimate
interests'" (quoting Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 799 (1989))).
63. See Brandt, supra note 21, at 789 (maintaining that Central Hudson test has become
modem determination of constitutionality in reviewing state restrictions on lawyer advertising
and solicitation).
64. 486 U.S. 466 (1988).
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of potential clients with known legal problems.' In this case, an
attorney applied to Kentucky's Attorney Advertising Commission for
approval of a letter he intended to send to potential clients.66
Although the Commission did not find the letter false or misleading,
the Commission would not approve it because a Kentucky Supreme
Court Rule prohibited targeted direct-mall advertisements.67 In
striking down the prohibition, the Court distinguished Shapero from
Ohralik, finding that a targeted letter "'poses much less risk of
overreaching'. . . than does in-person solicitation."' In Shapero, the
Court concluded that targeted, direct-mail solicitation does not
compromise the privacy rights of victims.69 The Court found that
the State could regulate advertising using much less restrictive means,
such as requiring the lawyer to file prospective solicitation letters with
a state agency.7" Although some lower courts have held that direct-
mail advertising should not fall within the scope of protected speech
under the First Amendment,7' Shapero remained the leading decision
on this subject until the Supreme Court decided Went For It in
1995.72 In 1989, Central Hudson was slightly modified by Board of
Trustees, State University of New York v. Fox,73 which held that the least
restrictive means test is no longer a requirement in commercial
65. See Kinsler, supra note 4, at 15 (noting that issue in Shapero was one of first impression
for Court).
66. Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Ass'n, 486 U.S. 466, 469 (1988). Shapero, a member of the
Kentucky Bar, wanted to target potential clients who had foreclosure suits filed against them and
were about to lose their homes. Id. The Commission declined to approve the letter on the
ground that a then-existing Kentucky Supreme Court Rule prohibited the mailing or delivery
of direct-mail advertisements targeted to recipients with unique circumstances. Id. at 469-70 &
n.2. Shapero then sought an advisory opinion as to the Rule's validity from the State Bar
Association's Ethics Committee, which upheld the Rule as consistent with Rule 7.3 of the ABA's
Model Rules of Professional Conduct. Id. at 470. On review of the Ethics Committee's advisory
opinion, the Kentucky Supreme Court replaced the Kentucky rule with the ABA's Rule 7.3. Id.
Rule 7.3 prohibits "targeted, direct-mail solicitation by lawyers for pecuniary gain, without a
particularized finding that the solicitation is false or misleading." Id. at 471 (citing MODEL
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 7.3 (1983)).
67. Id. at 470.
68. Id. at 475 (quoting Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 642
(1985)).
69. See id. at 476 (observing that targeted letter does not invade recipient's privacy any more
than substantively identical letter mailed to public).
70. Id
71. Norris v. Alabama State Bar, 582 So. 2d 1034, 1037 (Ala. 1991) (upholding suspension
of attorney for sending flowers to fineral home along with note to decedent's family offering
assistance and brochure describing law firm's services), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 957 (1991); see In
re Anis, 599 A.2d 1265, 1269-72 (NJ. 1992) (finding attorney's letter soliciting family of
Lockerbie plane-crash victim offensive and undeserving of commercial speech protection), cert.
denied sub nom. Anis v. NewJersey Comm. on Attorney Advertising, 504 U.S. 957 (1992).
72. See Richardson, supra note 1, at 38 (asserting that Shapero is leading case providing
significant protection to lawyers who engage in direct-mail solicitation).
73. 492 U.S. 469 (1989).
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speech cases. Therefore, as Justice Scalia articulated in Fox, the final
element in the Central Hudson analysis is now whether the regulation
does not "burden substantially more speech than is necessary to
further the government's legitimate interests."74 As Fox illustrates, a
state's ability to regulate commercial speech has increased significantly
since the Court has done away with the least restrictive means test.
II. FLoRzDA BAR V. WENT FOR IT, INC.: AN OVERVIEW
In 1990, the Florida Supreme Court, at the urging of the Florida
Bar, enacted Rule 4-7.4(b) (1), 7' which prohibits lawyers from
sending targeted letters to solicit employment from victims or
survivors of an accident resulting in personal injury or wrongful death
within thirty days of such accident.76 The thirty-day moratorium on
direct-mail solicitation was precipitated by a two-year Florida Bar Study
that surveyed the effects of lawyer advertising on public opinion.
77
G. Stewart McHenry, a Florida lawyer, challenged this rule as violative
of the First Amendment.7  McHenry and his lawyer referral service,
Went For It, Inc.,79 filed an action for declaratory and injunctive
74. Board of Trustees, State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 477 (1989).
75. See The Florida Bar. Petition to Amend the Rules Regulating the Florida Bar-Ad-
vertising Issues, 571 So. 2d 451, 466 (Fla. 1990) (enacting Rule 4-7.4(b) (1)). Rule 4-7.4(B) (1)
provides:
A lawyer shall not send, or knowingly permit to be sent.... a written communication
to a prospective client for the purpose of obtaining professional employment if. a.
The written communication concerns an action for personal injury or wrongful death
or otherwise relates to an accident or disaster involving the person to whom the
communication is addressed or a relative of that person, unless the accident or disaster
occurred more than thirty days prior to the mailing of the communication.
Id.
76. See Went For I4 115 S. Ct. at 2374 (discussing Florida Bar Rules creating 30-day blackout
period after accident during which lawyers may not single out accident or disaster victims or
their relatives to solicit their business); Florida Bar Petition to Amend, 571 So. 2d at 472 (re-
numbering Rule 4-7.7 to Rule 4-7.8(a)). Rule 4-7.8(a) states that
[a] lawyer shall not accept referrals from lawyer referral service unless the service: (1)
engages in no communication with the public and in no direct contact with prospective
clients in manner that would violate the Rules of Professional Conduct if the
communication or contact were made by the lawyer.
Went For 1 115 S. Ct. at 2374 (citing amendments to Rorida Bar: Petition to Amend, 571 So. 2d
at 451).
77. See Went For It, 115 S. Ct. at 2374 (noting two-year Florida Bar study involving hearings,
commissioning of surveys, and reviewing extensive public commentary on effects of lawyer
advertising on public opinion, and recommending that advertising rules be changed).
78. Id. The respondent, Went For It, Inc., and John T. Blakely, another Florida lawyer,
were substituted for Stewart McHenry when McHenry was disbarred in October 1992 for reasons
unrelated to this suit. See Florida Bar v. McHenry, 605 So. 2d 459, 460 (Fla. 1992) (disbarring
McHenry for sexual misconduct, including masturbation in presence of clients).
79. See Greenhouse, supra note 15, at A22 (explaining that McHenry, owner of Went For
It, Inc., made his living finding clients for personal-injury lawyers by soliciting accident victims).
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relief in the United States District Court for the Middle District of
Florida. 80
Relying on Shapero, the district court entered summaryjudgment for
the plaintiffs"' and the Eleventh Circuit affirmed on similar
grounds, 2 noting that it was bound by precedent to affirm the
district court's decision. 3 The Eleventh Circuit indicated that the
Florida Bar's attempt to regulate lawyer solicitation was reasonable
and recognized Florida's interest in protecting the privacy of accident
victims, but nevertheless felt compelled by Supreme Court precedent
to affirm the lower court ruling in favor of Went For It, Inc. 4 The
United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed. 5
The Supreme Court held that the Florida restriction withstood First
Amendment scrutiny under the Central Hudson test for restrictions on
commercial speech.86 The Court found that the Florida Bar had a
substantial interest in protecting the privacy of accident victims from
invasive contact by lawyers and in preventing the erosion of confi-
dence in the legal profession." The Court determined that the
restriction was sufficiently narrow in scope and duration to address
the purported harms caused by direct-mail solicitation.'u
80. McHenry v. Florida Bar, 808 F. Supp. 1543 (M.D. Fla. 1992), affld 21 F.3d 1038 (11th
Cir. 1994), rev'd sub nom. Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 2371 (1995).
81. Id. at 1548. The case came before the district court on the recommendation of a
magistrate that the parties' competing summary judgment motions be decided in favor of the
defendant, the Florida Bar. Id. at 1544. The district court held that the challenged rules
.substantially impair and impede the availability of truthful and relevant information which can
make a positive contribution to consumers in need of legal services" and violated the First, Fifth,
and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution. Id. at 1548. Therefore, the district court
granted summary judgment for the plaintiffs. Id.
82. McHenry v. Florida Bar, 21 F.3d 1038 (11th Cir. 1994), rev'd sub nom. Florida Bar v.
Went For It, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 2371 (1995).
83. See id. at 1045 (referencing Supreme Court's holding in Bates and noting that "[w] care
disturbed that Bates and its progeny require the decision we reach today").
84. Id. at 1045. The Eleventh Circuit noted that it was forced to recognize the existence
of members of the legal profession who solicit accident victims during periods of grief. Id.
85. Went For It, 115 S. Ct. at 2381 (finding that Florida Bar has substantial interest in
protecting injured Floridians, preventing erosion of confidence in profession of law, and that
rules designed by Florida Bar to prevent these harms are narrow in scope and duration).
86. 1&
87. Id. The Court observed that repeated invasions of privacy by lawyers have caused
people to lose confidence in the legal profession. Id.
88. Id.
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III. ANALYSIS OF FLORIDA BAR V. WENT FOR IT, INC.: LIMITED
PROTECTION FOR ATTORNEY ADVERTISING UNDER THE FIRST
AMENDMENT
A. Justice O'Connor's Majority Opinion
Justice O'Connor's majority opinion in Went For It signified that
lawyers are not entitled to the same constitutional protection as other
professionals who advertise. 9 The Court limited the holding in
Virginia Pharmacy to pharmacists9" and found that the type of
products offered by attorneys and physicians, unlike pharmacists, are
not standardized and are therefore more likely to confuse or deceive
the consumer through advertising.91 Moreover, in Went For It, the
Court determined that the advertising at issue in Bates v. State Bar of
Arizona was protected commercial speech because the attorneys were
only advertising "routine" legal services.92 In Went For It, however,
the Court implied that representing accident victims is not a "routine"
legal service and, therefore, is more susceptible to regulation.93
This distinction, however, is without merit because the Court
ignores the acceptance in Bates of the usefulness of legal advertising.94
Bates stands for the proposition that while consumers may not use
advertising as the sole criterion when selecting an attorney, it is unfair
to deny consumers the relevant information conveyed by advertising
when deciding whether to retain an attorney or when choosing which
attorney to retain.95 Further, as stated by the Court in Virginia
Pharmacy, "[a] dvertising, however tasteless and excessive it may seem,
is nonetheless dissemination of information as to who is producing
89. 1& at 2375 (asserting that because lawyers provide services of infinite variety, legal
advertising is not entitled to same protection as other professionals who advertise standardized
products).
90. See id. (observing that Virginia Pharmacy applied only to pharmacists and noting that,
unlike pharmacists, doctors and lawyers do not dispense standardized products).
91. See id. (explaining that professional services offered by doctors and lawyers are ofalmost
infinite variety and thus entail more possibility for confusion and deception in certain kinds of
advertising (citing Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.,
425 U.S. 748, 773 n.25 (1976))).
92. See id. (maintaining that only "routine" legal services such as "'the uncontested divorce,
the simple adoption, the uncontested personal bankruptcy, and the change of name'" lend
themselves to advertising (quoting Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 372 (1977))).
93. See i&. (stating that commercial speech enjoys limited protection, and is subject to
modes of regulation that might not be permissible for non-commercial speech).
94. See Bates, 433 U.S. at 373-74 (noting that legal advertising provides consumers with
relevant information needed to make informed decisions).
95. &e. at 374-75 & n.30.
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and selling what product, for what reason, and at what price.""6
Protection of commercial speech stems from the recognition of its
important role in the development of consumer awareness in a free
enterprise economy.9 7 The fact that some people might find legal
advertising offensive or beneath the dignity of the bar cannot justify
suppressing it.
98
Before analyzing the Florida Bar regulation in Went Forlt, the Court
distinguished commercial speech from other types of speech
protected by the First Amendment.9 The majority pointed out that
commercial speech enjoys less First Amendment protection than other
forms of speech and, therefore, is more readily subject to government
regulation." The Court observed that if commercial and non-
commercial speech are both given equal First Amendment protection,
the force of the First Amendment's guarantee would be dimin-
ished.' The Court reasoned that "to require a parity of constitu-
tional protection for commercial and noncommercial speech alike
could invite dilution, simply by a leveling process of the force of the
Amendment's guarantee with respect to the latter kind of
speech.""1 2 With these concerns in mind, the Court analyzed the
Florida Bar restriction on direct-mail advertising under the "interme-
diate" scrutiny analysis set forth in Central Hudson.103
96. Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 765; see also Brief of Amicus Curiae the Media Institute,
the Freedom of Expression Foundation, and the ThomasJefferson Center for the Protection of
Free Expression in Support of Respondents at 6, Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 2371
(1995) (No. 94-226) [hereinafter Media Institute Brief] (advocating that advertising is important
form of speech that government should not censor unless it is false or misleading).
97. See Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 766 (1993) (acknowledging that seller has strong
financial incentive to educate market and stimulate demand for his or her product or service);
Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 763-65 (suggesting that advertising is indispensable to proper
allocation of resources in free enterprise system).
98. See Edenfield, 507 U.S. at 767 (suggesting that government should not censor particular
commercial message because some members of population believe message to be of slight
worth); Zaudererv. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626,648 (1985) (questioning degree
of purported state interest in having attorneys maintain dignity in their communications with
public and for holding that mere possibility that some members of public or Ohio Bar might
find attorney advertising embarrassing cannotjustify suppressing it (citing Carey v. Population
Serv. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 701 (1977))); Bates, 433 U.S. at 369-70 (disputing assertion that
advertising diminishes attorney's reputation in community).
99. Went For t, 115 S. Ct. at 2375.
100. See id. (pointing to commercial speech's "subordinate position on scale of First
Amendment values" (citing Board of Trustees, State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 481
(1989))).
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 2375-76. The Court considers the Central Hudson test an intermediate standard
because of the term "substantial government interest," and because the fit between the ends and
means is "not necessarily the least restrictive means but.., a means narrowly tailored to achieve
the desired objective." Id. at 2380. In the non-commercial speech First Amendment context,
"narrowly tailored" is used to describe the means of achieving the regulation. SeeWard v. Rock
1996] FLORIDA BAR V. WENT FOR IT, INC. 1229
B. Application of the Central Hudson Test
Under Central Hudson, the government may freely regulate
commercial speech that concerns unlawful activity or is mislead-
ing."° Commercial speech that does not fall into either of these
categories, like the advertising at issue in Went ForIt, may be regulated
if the government satisfies the three-part Central Hudson test. 5
1. Central Hudson'sfirst prong
To show a substantial government interest in regulating direct-mail
solicitations by lawyers-the first prong of the Central Hudson
analysis-the Florida Bar relied on the need to protect the privacy
and tranquility of personal injury victims and their families against
"intrusive, unsolicited contact by lawyers."' The Bar maintained
that because the public perceived direct-mail solicitations as intrusive,
the reputation of the legal profession in Florida had suffered." 7
According to the Florida Bar, in addition to protecting injury victims
and their families, the regulation was also designed to protect the
reputations of Florida lawyers by preventing them from engaging in
Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 799 (1989) (defining regulation as "narrowly tailored" if it
promotes substantial governmental interest that would be achieved less effectively absent
regulation). In the equal protection arena, a regulation will be upheld under rational basis
review as long as another branch of government arguably had a legitimate basis for creating the
classification. JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 574 (4th ed.
1991). Under strict scrutiny, the Court will not accept every permissible government purpose
as sufficient to support the classification. Id. at 575. Rather, the government must show that
it is pursuing a compelling end. Id. Under an intermediate standard of review, the government
can satisfy its burden with less than a compelling interest, although not as much deference is
given to the legislature as in rational basis review. Id. at 576.
104. Went For It 115 S. CL at 2376 (citing Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv.
Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 563-64 (1980)).
105. 1d; see also Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 564-65 (listing three-prong test as "first, the
government must assert a substantial interest in support of its regulation; second, the
government must demonstrate that the restriction on commercial speech directly and materially
advances that interest; and third, the regulation must be 'narrowly drawn'"). Before analyzing
the regulation, the Court was careful to differentiate the Central Hudson intermediate scrutiny
standard from the "rational basis" test used primarily in equal protection cases. Went For It, 115
S. CL at 2376 (citing Edenfield v. Fane, 113 S. Ct. 1792, 1798 (1993)); see also Board of Trustees,
State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 480 (1989) (noting difference between Central Hudson
standard and rational basis review).
106. Went For It 115 S. Ct at 2376; see also Brief for Petitioner at 8, 25-27, Florida Barv. Went
For It, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 2371 (1995) (No. 94-226) [hereinafter Petitioner's Brief] (arguing that
State has substantial interest in protecting personal privacy and tranquility of recent accident
victims or victims' families).
107. Went For It 115 S. CL at 2376; see Linda Greenhouse, High Court's Opinions on Lawyers'
Ads: Sharp Words and Sharp Scrutiny, N.Y. TIMES, June 23, 1995, at A23 (observing that amicus
brief filed by Trial Lawyers of America argues that disrespect for legal profession from
solicitation results in lower damages awarded by juries).
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direct-mail solicitation.0 8 The Supreme Court had little difficulty
crediting these interests as substantial.10 9
In finding that Florida has a substantial interest in protecting the
privacy of accident victims and their relatives from lawyer solicitation,
the Court cited Frisby v. Schultz' ° and Carey v. Brown."' Both cases
involved government regulation of picketing in residential neighbor-
hoods." 2 In Went For It, the Court used these cases to support the
argument that because protecting the privacy of the home is of
utmost importance, the Court should give deference to the state when
it legislates in this area."'
The Court's analogy, however, between the privacy interests at stake
in Went For It and those in Frisby and Carey, is flawed. 11 An essential
element in the government's protection of privacy interests in Frisby
and Carey was the inability of the residents to avoid the communica-
tion at issue."- In Fisby, the residents could not avoid the loud
protestors picketing outside the residents' home."6 In contrast, the
recipient of direct-mall solicitation can easily disregard the communi-
cation by throwing it away." 7 Unlike the complaining residents in
Frisby and Carey, the direct-mall recipients, to avoid the intrusion of
privacy, must simply "'avert[] their eyes."' Consequently, the
108. Went For I, 115 S. Ct. at 2376.
109. I. On other occasions, the Court has accepted the proposition that "'[s]tates have a
compelling interest in the practice of professions within their boundaries, and ... as part of
their power to protect the public health, safety, and other valid interests they have broad power
to establish standards for licensing practitioners and regulating the practice of professions."'
Id. (quoting Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 792 (1975)).
110. 487 U.S. 474 (1988). In Frisby, abortion protesters brought suit seeking to enjoin
enforcement of a municipal ordinance prohibiting picketing around the residence or dwelling
of any individual. Id. at 477.
111. 447 U.S. 455 (1980). In Carey, the plaintiff brought an action for declaratory and
injunctive relief barring enforcement of the Illinois residential picketing statute. Id. at 458.
112. SeeFrisby, 487U.S. at476-77 (upholding ban on picketingofparticularresidence); Carey,
447 U.S. at 457 (striking down statute that prohibited picketing of residences or dwellings, but
exempted peaceful picketing of place of employment involved in labor dispute).
113. Went For It, 115 S. Ct. at 2376-77.
114. See Brief of Amicus Curiae Public Citizen in Support of Respondent at 6, Florida Bar
v. Went For It, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 2371 (1995) (No. 94-226) [hereinafter Public Citizen Brief]
(disputing Florida Bar argument that mall solicitation at issue in Went For It is as invasive as
sound truck at issue in Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949), or residential picketing in Frisby,
487 U.S. at 476).
115. See Frisby, 487 U.S. at 484-85 (noting that citizens have right to avoid intrusions such as
unwanted picketing); Carey, 447 U.S. at 471 (reinforcing citizen's right to be let alone in privacy
of own home); see also Public Citizen Brief, supra note 114, at 6 (describing unavoidable
communications in Frisby and Carey).
116. SeeFrisby, 487 U.S. at486-87 (indicating that picketing in residential area has devastating
effect on quiet enjoyment of home).
117. Public Citizen Brief, supra note 114, at 6.
118. Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 72 (1983) (quoting Cohen v.
California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971)).
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"short, regular, journey from mail box to trash can... is an accept-
able burden, at least so far as the Constitution is concerned."119
The First Amendment prohibits the government from regulating
commercial speech unless the objectionable speech is directed
unavoidably toward a captive audience. 120 The Court has never held
that the "government itself can shut off the flow of mailings to protect
those recipients who might potentially be offended."121  Moreover,
household residents, the targeted audience in Went For It, are by no
means captive and can easily avoid the direct-mail advertising at
issue.122  Therefore, Florida's ban on direct-mail advertising by
attorneys is an unconstitutional restriction on free speech.'2
The Florida Bar also asserted that the State of Florida had a
substantial government interest in improving the reputation of the
legal profession. 24 Acting as the regulatory agency for lawyers in
the State," the Florida Bar adopted this restriction to curtail
"ambulance chasing." 26  The ban was designed to "protect the
flagging reputations of Florida lawyers" by preventing them from
soliciting accident victims and their families. 27 In Went For It, the
Supreme Court agreed with the Florida Bar and determined that
these interests satisfied the first prong of the Central Hudson test.
28
Although the Bar's restriction may be legitimate, "the general rule
is that the speaker and the audience, not the government, assess the
value of the information presented." 29 The possibility that some
people may find the particular commercial message offensive should
not empower the government to deprive attorneys of their right to
119. Id. (citing Lamontv. Commissioner of MotorVehicles, 269 F. Supp. 880,883 (S.D.N.Y.),
aft'd, 386 F.2d 449 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denie4 391 U.S. 915 (1968)); see also Public Citizen Brief,
supra note 114, at 6 (contending that burden of direct-mail solicitation is trivial and cannot
justify serious abridgement of First Amendment rights); Went ForIt, 115 S. Ct. at 2382 (Kennedy,
J., dissenting) (maintaining that Court in Shapero reasoned that recipient of letter can readily
ignore, discard, or place letter in drawer).
120. Bolger, 463 U.S. at 72 (citing Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S.
530, 542 (1980)).
121. I&
122. Went For It; 115 S. Ct. at 2383 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (explaining that household
occupants are not captive audience (citing Consolidated Edison, 447 U.S. at 542)).
123. 1& (KennedyJ., dissenting).
124. Id at 2376 (noting outrage of Florida citizens who received mail solicitations from
attorneys within days of deadly accidents and commenting that such outrage has tainted general
perception of legal profession).
125. See Richardson, supra note 1, at 38 (noting that Florida Bar adopted 30-day ban under
its regulatory powers).
126. Went For t 115 S. Ct. at 2378; see also Petitioner's Brief, supra note 106, at 28 (asserting
that conduct sought to be regulated in Shapero differed from universally condemned conduct
in this case).
127. Went For It 115 S. Ct. at 2376.
128. Md (recognizing that Florida Bar's asserted interests are substantial and compelling).
129. Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 767 (1993).
1996] 1231
1232 THE AMERICAN UNERSnIY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 45:1215
inform the public about their services through truthful, non-deceptive
speech." ° Therefore, the restriction does not satisfy the first prong
of Central Hudson.13
2. Central Hudson's second prong
After finding the Florida Bar's interest substantial, the majority
addressed the second prong of the Central Hudson test. Under that
prong, the state must demonstrate that the challenged regulation
"advances the government's interest in a direct and material way,"3'
that the harms sought to be avoided are real, and that the
government's restriction will materially alleviate those harms. 13 3 In
Went For It, the Court relied on statistics gathered by the Florida Bar
for a two-year study of lawyer advertising and solicitation.M The
Bar submitted a summary of this study to the record to support its
contention that the Florida public views direct-mail solicitation of
accident victims by lawyers as an intrusion on privacy that harms the
reputation of the legal profession.' -5
AsJustice Kennedy points out in his dissent, however, the summary
prepared by the Florida Bar contains many flaws overlooked by the
majority opinion.' 5 First, the summary only obtained responses
from 200 Floridians, all of whom had received direct-mail advertising
130. See Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 648 (1985) (recognizing
that, while state may have substantial interest in ensuring dignity of legal profession, Court
questions whether this behavior warrants abridgement of First Amendment rights); Media
Institute Brief, supra note 96, at 6 (arguing that under Petitioner's theory, government can
censor virtually any form of speech by claiming to act for benefit of vulnerable people).
131. See Went For It, 115 S. Ct. at 2383 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (maintaining that mere
possibility that expression might offend listener does notjustify speech restrictions).
132. Id at 2377 (citing Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 115 S. Ct. 1585, 1588 (1995)); see also
Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 564 (1980)
(determining that regulation must be in proportion to state's interest in restricting speech).
133. Went For It, 115 S. Ct. at 2377 (citing Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 770 (1993)).
134. See Summary of the Record in No. 74,987 (Fla.) on Petition to Amend the Rules
Regulating Lawyer Advertising, App. H, p. 2 (cited in Went For It, 115 S. Ct. at 2377). A survey
of Florida adults commissioned by the Bar indicated that Floridians have a negative opinion
about attorneys who use direct-mall advertising. Went For It, 115 S. Ct. at 2377. Fifty-four
percent of the population surveyed said that contacting persons concerning accidents or similar
events is a violation of privacy. Id. A random sampling of persons who received direct-mail
advertising from lawyers in 1987 revealed that 45% believed that direct-mail solicitation is
"designed to take advantage of gullible or unstable people;" 34% found such tactics "annoying
or irritating;" 26% found it "an invasion of your privacy;" and 24% reported that it "made you
angry." Id. Twenty-seven percent of surveyed direct-mal recipients reported that their regard
for the legal profession and for the judicial process as a whole was "lower" as a result of
receiving the direct mail. Id
135. See Went For It, 115 S. Ct. at 2377 (finding that Bar survey effectively bolstered argument
that mail solicitations foster public resentment of legal profession).
136. See id. at 2384 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (observing that Court relied on document
containing statistical information, which was prepared by adverse party, Florida Bar).
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from lawyers." 7 Second, the summary included no actual surveys,
few indications of sample size or selection procedures, no explana-
tions of methodology, and no discussion of extended results. "
Third, the summary contained only negative responses, omitting
favorable opinions on lawyer advertising." 9 While the majority
describes the Bar's record as "noteworthy for its breadth and
detail,"'" the dissent argues that it is "noteworthy for its incompe-
tence."
1 4 1
The majority distinguished Shapero and Edenfield from Went For It
because no empirical data, studies, or anecdotes were offered to
support the ban on solicitation in these latter cases.1  In Went For
It, the Court found that the Florida Bar assembled evidence sufficient
to justify the restriction.' The Court relied exclusively on this
evidence to satisfy the second prong of the Central Hudson test. 44
137. Brief for Respondents at 32, Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 2371 (1995)
(No. 94-226) [hereinafter Respondent's Brief]. Among the 200 direct-mail recipients, 83% said
they would be impartial jurors in spite of receiving direct-mail advertising from a lawyer. Id.
Sixty-six percent of the recipients claimed that their opinion of the legal profession and the
judicial process has not changed since receiving direct-mail advertising from an attorney. Id
138. Went For 14 115 S. Ct. at 2384 (KennedyJ., dissenting) (asserting that because summary
contains "selective synopses of unvalidated studies," it is unreliable and incompetent).
139. Respondent's Brief, supra note 137, at 33; see also Went For I4 115 S. Ct. at 2384
(Kennedy, J., dissenting) (observing that Florida Bar survey, unlike submitted summary, also
contained positive comments regarding attorneys and direct-mail advertising). Justice Kennedy
noted that the selective synopses of unvalidated studies were carried out, for the most part, on
television and phone book advertising, and not direct-mail solicitations. WentForlt, 115 S. Ct.
at 2384 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Of the 34 pages discussing direct-mail solicitation, only two
contained a synopsis of a study concerning the attitudes of Floridians toward such solicitations.
Id.
140. Went For I4 115 S. Ct. at 2377.
141. See Went For I4 115 S. Ct. at 2384 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (attacking validity of studies
because they deal primarily with television advertising and phone book listings, and not direct-
mail solicitations).
142. SeeEdenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 770 (1993) (noting that State Board of Accountancy
offered no studies validating Board's arguments that CPA solicitations endangered legitimacy
of profession). The Board presented no studies indicating that in-person solicitation ofpotential
business clients by certified public accountants creates danger of fraud or overreaching. Id. at
770-71; see also Went For I4 115 S. Ct. at 2378 (asserting that in Shapero, Kentucky Bar Association
assembled no statistical evidence demonstrating any actual harm caused by direct-mail
advertising by lawyers).
143. Went For IA 115 5. Ct. at 2378-79 (citing to Bar study as main reason why Court decided
to uphold ban on direct-mail solicitation).
144. See i& ("[W]e are satisfied that the ban on direct-mail solicitation.., targets a concrete,
nonspeculative harm."). The Florida Bar also could have argued that a significant difference
exists between targeting people whose mortgages have been foreclosed, as in Shapero, and
targeting accident victims, as in Went For It. While accident victims and persons facing
foreclosure may both need timely legal representation, accident victims and their families may
deserve more privacy in the wake of an accident or disaster. Accident victims may have suffered
both severe physical and emotional trauma. Persons whose mortgages have been foreclosed are
not likely to have suffered physical injury.
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The Court in Went For It stated that direct-mail solicitation is
different than other forms of permissible advertising." Writing for
the majority, Justice O'Connor argued that untargeted letters are less
harmful than direct-mail solicitations because untargeted letters do
not invade the privacy of injured parties or their families. In the
majority's view, targeted letters harm the legal community more than
untargeted letters. 47
The majority contends that recent accident victims and their
families are especially vulnerable and may therefore require greater
protection than other citizens. 8 But Florida rules already provide
increased protection to recipients of lawyer solicitation;149 the
envelope and every page of all lawyer solicitation letters must bear a
statement, in red ink, advising the recipient that the letter is an
advertisement)"' With this warning, the recipients are only exposed
to the solicitation if they take the affirmative step of opening the
envelope and reading its contents.151
Prior to Went For It, the only form of solicitation that states had the
ability to regulate was in-person solicitation. 52 The Court in Ohralik
found that in-person solicitation places pressure on the recipient
because an immediate response is often demanded.'53 The Court
also reasoned that the potential for overreaching is greater "when a
lawyer, a professional trained in the art of persuasion, personally
145. Id. at 2379 (observing that direct-mail solicitation is more obtrusive than untargeted
letter).
146. Id. (stating that, unlike untargeted solicitations, direct-mail solicitations confront
grieving individuals while their "wounds are still open").
147. Id.
148. SeePublic Citizen Brief, supra note 114, at 5 (asserting that direct-mail solicitations upset
tranquility of vulnerable, bereaved persons). For an account of one "scavenger lawyer's" contact
with a family while coping with the father's job-related death, see T.L. Henion, Victims' Families
Strive to Cope OMAHA WORLD HERALD, Dec. 15, 1994, at 10 (observing that out-of-state lawyer
telephoned victim's family shortly after explosion).
149. See The Florida Bar: Petition to Amend the Rules Regulating the Florida Bar-
Advertising Issues, 571 So. 2d 451, 467 (Fla. 1991) (discussing Rule 4.7-4(b) (6), which requires
notice of advertisement); see also Public Citizen Brief, supra note 114, at 5 (discussing Florida
Rule 4.7-4(b) (6), which provides guidelines for direct-mail material).
150. See The lorida Bar Petition to Amend, 571 So. 2d at 467 (enacting Rule 4.7-4(b) (6),
which requires clearly marked envelope and letter with word "advertisement" printed in red
ink). This rule intends to give the recipient the choice of whether or not to read the letter.
Public Citizen Brief, supra note 114, at 5.
151. See Public Citizen Brief, supra note 114, at 5-6 (observing Court's finding in several cases
that those who do not want to be troubled by such advertisements can readily discard them
unopened).
152. See Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 464 (1978) (upholding regulation
because of state's well-founded perception of potential for overreaching by lawyers during in-
person solicitations).
153. Id. at 457.
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solicits an unsophisticated, injured, or distressed lay person. ""'
Moreover, the Court found that people would be more likely to place
their trust in a lawyer in response to face-to-face solicitation. 155
Ohralik concerned a face-to-face encounter, however, which, unlike
the direct-mail solicitation at issue in Went For It, leaves the recipient
little time to react to the services being offered. 6
In Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp.,57 the Court struck down
a regulation prohibiting the mailing of unsolicited contraceptive
advertisements despite the government's argument that recipients
were likely to find the materials offensive.' 58 In Bolger, the Court
emphasized the value of disseminating truthful information to the
public.'59 Moreover, the Court has consistently held that the right
to use the mails for advertising purposes is protected by the First
Amendment." A truthful and non-deceptive letter, such as the
advertisement at issue in Went For It, has never before been subject to
the same level of scrutiny as in-person solicitation.' 6' Therefore,
Went For It represents a substantial departure from previous cases
where direct-mall solicitation had been a protected medium for
communication.
3. Central Hudson's third prong
Under Central Hudson's third prong, the Court in Went For It
examined whether the means used to enforce the Florida Bar
restriction on advertising were narrowly tailored to fit the goal of
protecting accident victims from invasive conduct by lawyers. 6 ' The
Court explained that the fit between the legislature's ends and the
154. Id. at 465.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 457 (concluding that person receiving face-to-face solicitation has little chance to
reflect or consider options).
157. 463 U.S. 60 (1983).
158. See Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 75 (1983) (finding that First
Amendment protected mailing of contraceptive advertisements as free speech).
159. See id. at 74 (asserting that impeding truthful flow of information on contraception is
constitutionally invalid). The Court in Bolger also observed that, in light of statistics showing that
a high percentage of the adolescent female population in 1978 was sexually active, adolescent
children have a pressing need for information on contraception. I&. at 74 n.30.
160. Id. at 76; see also Went For I, 115 S. Ct. at 2883 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (illuminating
Court's protection of mail advertising by discussing Bolger); see also Shapero v. Kentucky Bar
Ass'n, 486 U.S. 466, 476 (1988) (protecting attorney's right to engage in direct-mail advertising).
161. See Shapero, 486 U.S. at 479 (distinguishing between permissible direct-mail solicitation
and unconstitutional in-person solicitation).
162. Went For It, 115 S. Ct. at 2380.
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means chosen to accomplish those ends need not be perfect, but
must be reasonable."
In finding that the means chosen to accomplish the restriction on
solicitation were reasonable, the Court ignores the ban's failure to
afford differing degrees of protection according to the severity of
injury sustained by accident victims who receive direct mail from
lawyers."6 The ban applies to all recipients of direct-mail solicita-
tion, regardless of whether the accident victim sustained a serious
injury" Prior Supreme Court opinions have only upheld restrictions
on lawyer solicitation that were narrowly tailored to achieve the
government's. interest."6 The Court has not upheld overly broad
regulations. 7 For example, in Central Hudson, the Court struck
down restrictions on advertising as too excessive in their limitation of
commercial speech."~ Some injuries cause very little pain or
suffering to the accident victim. In situations where the victim
sustains a minor injury, the state's interest in protecting the victim's
privacy is not as substantial as in cases where the victim sustains a
serious injury. This is because minor injuries do not tend to
traumatize accident victims or their families to the extent of more
serious injuries. Therefore the necessity for peace and tranquility
following a less serious accident is not as strong. Thus, by enacting
a blanket prohibition on all direct-mail advertising without regard to
the severity of the injury, the reasonable fit requirement is not
satisfied. 6 9
163. See id. (asserting that in Board of Trustees v. Fox Court made clear that "least restrictive
means" test has no role in commercial speech context). The Court also pointed out that the
least restrictive means test is not equivalent to the rational basis test which would present the
Florida Bar with a much smaller obstacle for its regulation to overcome. Id. (citing Cincinnati
v. Discovery Network, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 1505, 1510 n.13 (1993)).
164. Went For 14 115 S. Ct at 2384 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
165. See id. at 2384-85 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (observing that criminal law routinely
distinguishes between degrees of bodily harm to argue that majority's decision to apply ban to
all injuries based on difficulty of making this type of distinction is unjustified); UNITED STATES
SENTENCING COMMISSION GUIDELINES MANUAL § IBI.I, cmt., n. 1(b), (h), & (j) (Nov. 1994)
(providing sentencing guidelines).
166. See Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Ass'n, 486 U.S. 466, 476 (1988) (determining that
restriction on direct-mail solicitation was more extensive than necessary to serve government's
interest because state can regulate solicitation through less restrictive means).
167. See Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 777 (1993) (striking down Florida Board of
Accountancy's ban on in-person solicitation because "'broad prophylactic rules in the area of
free expression are suspect'" (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963))).
168. Central Hudson Gas &Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557,569-70 (1980).
The Court determined that the NewYork Public Service Commission failed to demonstrate that
a more limited restriction would not have adequately served the state's interests. Id. at 570.
169. See Went ForIt, 115 S. Ct. at 2385 (KennedyJ., dissenting) (asserting that if delineation
between degrees of bodily harm is workable in criminal law context, it should have been done
with Florida Bar restriction).
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C. Floida's Ban on Direct Mail Is Underinclusive
Neither party in Went For It raised the argument that the ban on
solicitation is underinclusive and, therefore, violates the Fourteenth
Amendment guarantee of equal protection.1 71 The ban applies only
to lawyers seeking to represent accident victims or the victims'
families.1  It does not prohibit insurance adjusters or defense
lawyers from contacting accident victims at any time following an
accident or disaster. 72 Moreover, insurance companies and defense
lawyers are not restricted in their mode of communication and are
free to make in-person visits and telephone calls. 3  The ban does
little, therefore, to accomplish its goal of insulating accident victims
and their families from potentially unwelcome intrusions.
7 4
Florida's ban on direct-mail solicitations deprives victims of
information concerning legal representation at the time they need it
most: when defense attorneys and insurance companies are urging
victims to settle or waive their claims.7 5 Many accident victims will
forego their opportunity to initiate a lawsuit or will accept settlements
far below what their claim is worth because they lack information on
whether they should file a lawsuit. As a result, large corporations and
manufacturers will face fewer lawsuits from accident victims and pay
less in legal damages. These companies will have less incentive to
make safer products because the risk of multi-million dollar lawsuits
is reduced. 17
6
170. See Public Citizen Brief, supra note 114, at 7 (advancing argument that because ban
operates only against plaintiffs' lawyers seeking to represent accident victims and their families
and not against defense lawyers, it is underinclusive). While the goal of protecting citizens
during a time of deep personal trauma is commendable in the abstract, it is not advanced by
the mailing ban. Id.
171. Public Citizen Brief, supra note 114, at 7.
172. Public Citizen Brief, supra note 114, at 7; see also Went For It 115 S. Ct. at 2385
(Kennedy, J., dissenting) (noting that victims should be warned not to enter into settlement
negotiations or evidentiary discussions with investigators for opposing parties).
173. Public Citizen Brief, supra note 114, at 7.
174. Public Citizen Brief, supra note 114, at 7.
175. Public Citizen Brief, supra note 114, at 7; see, e.g., John Saunders &Jack Kresnak, Putting
a Price Tag on Life: Insurers Talk with Crash Victims Families, DETROIT FREE PREss, Mar. 7, 1987,
at 1A (discussing tactics used by insurance companies to settle claims with victims' families in
aftermath of tragic disasters); John Spelich, Air Disasters Pit Insurers Against Lawyers, DErROIT
FREE PRESS, Aug. 18, 1987, at 12B (observing that immediately after Pan Am airline crash,
representatives of Pan Am's insurance company began contacting victim's families to settle
claims).
176. SeeDavid G. Owen, Problems in AssessingPunitiveDamagesAgainst Manufacturers ofDefective
Products, 49 U. Cm. L. Rav. 1, 8-9 (1982) (discussing deterrent effect of punitive damages on
manufacturers and large corporations); Richard A. Seltzer, Punitive Damages in Mass Tort
Litigation: Addressing the Problems of Fairness, Efficieny and Control, 52 FORDHAM L. REV. 37, 43
(1983) (observing that punitive damages in mass tort litigation provide incentives for companies
to design safer products).
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D. Effect of Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc.
Since the Court's opinion in Went For It, lower courts have had
more freedom to uphold restrictions on not only legal advertising, but
on other types of commercial speech. This Term, the Court will
determine whether a Rhode Island law prohibiting off-premises liquor
price advertising is constitutional."' In the legal arena, the Fifth
Circuit recently upheld an almost identical Texas law that creates a
thirty-day ban on direct-mail solicitation of accident victims. 178 In
South Carolina, the State Supreme Court relied on Went For It to
uphold a statute that prohibits the release of motor vehicle reports for
commercial solicitation purposes."'
IV. ADDITIONAL CONSIDERATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
In recent years, the public has criticized personal injury lawyers for
their assertive efforts to represent accident victims. The practice of
"ambulance chasers," who aggressively seek out potential clients in the
wake of fires, collisions, and other disasters, has been particularly
scrutinized." In response to these practices, bar associations have
conducted public information campaigns and have even sent their
own teams of lawyers to sites of major disasters to provide objective
information to victims.' Other states have imposed significant
restrictions on lawyer solicitation of accident victims. 2 Although
bar associations may have good intentions behind the solicitation
regulations, the courts must weigh the regulations against the
guarantees of the First Amendment.
A. Benefits of Attorney Advertising
In Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, Justice Powell predicted that
establishing First Amendment protection for lawyers would "effect
profound changes in the practice of law.""s  These changes have
177. 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 115 S. Ct. 1821 (1995) (granting certiorari).
178. Moore v. Morales, 63 F.3d 358, 363 (5th Cir. 1995).
179. Walkerv. South Carolina Dep't of Highways &PublicTransp., 466 S.E.2d 346,348 (S.C.
1996).
180. See Richardson, supra note 1, at 38 (recounting public criticism of quick arrival of
plaintiffs' lawyers after recent airplane crashes as overt and inappropriate solicitation).
181. See Richardson, supra note 1, at 38 (acknowledging that bar associations have sought to
provide objective information to accident victims after major accidents and disasters).
182. See Richardson, supra note 1, at 38.
183. Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 389 (1977) (Powell,J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (asserting that decision will weaken power of courts over members of bar).
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improved our justice system by increasing access to the legal sys-
tem."M Before Bates, middle-class citizens were often excluded from
the legal system because they were not poor enough to have counsel
appointed yet were too poor to afford high legal costs."S Bates
enabled attorneys to contact this segment of the population to offer
basic legal services for routine matters, such as drafting wills and
handling divorces."8 6 Permitting attorney advertising has contribut-
ed to a more competitive marketplace for legal services. Increased
competitiveness can lower costs for legal services, and therefore
provide greater access to the justice system. 7
Advertising also enables consumers to discover the available legal
options. As the Supreme Court recently noted, "[A] principal reason
why consumers do not consult lawyers is because they do not know
how to find a lawyer able to assist them with their particular prob-
lems." "St Banning direct-mail solicitation hurts those who most
need legal representation: people with injuries and victims who do
not know that an attorney would be interested in their claim.'89
Moreover, a thirty-day ban disadvantages victims who are not aware
that time is of the essence in gathering evidence and investigating the
cause of injury."°
184. See Brief of Hyatt Legal Services as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents at 2,
Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 2371 (1995) (No. 94-226) [hereinafter Hyatt Legal
Services Brief] (arguing that Bates decision, which permits attorneys to advertise to large portion
of nation's population, has improved access to legal system for Americans).
185. Id.
186. Id.; see also Bates, 433 U.S. at 372 (commenting that routine legal services such as
uncontested divorce, personal bankruptcy, and adoption lend themselves to advertising).
187. Hyatt Legal Services Brief, supra note 184, at 2. See generally Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. et
al., Why Lawyers Should Be Allowed to Advertise: A Market Analysis of Legal Seruices, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1084, 1107-09 (1983) (suggesting that increase in attorney advertising should lead to decrease
in price of "standardized" legal services).
188. Peel v. Attorney Registration & Disciplinary Comm'n, 496 U.S. 91, 110 n.18 (1990); see
also FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, STAFF REPORT ON IMPROVING CONSUMER ACCESS TO LEGAL
SERVICES: THE CASE FOR REMOVING RESTRICTIONS OF TRUTHFUL ADVERTISING 126-27 (1984)
(concluding that empirical data in study establishes strong evidence for relaxing restrictions on
truthful, non-deceptive advertising prices).
189. Went For 14 115 S. Ct. at 2385 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). The telephone book and
general advertisements may provide information for accident victims who need to obtain a
lawyer, but the effect of the ban on direct-mail solicitation will fall on those who most need legal
representation-for those with minor injuries, the victims too ill-informed to know an attorney
may be interested in their cases; for those with serious injuries, the victims too ill-informed to
know that time is of the essence if counsel is to assemble evidence and warn them not to enter
into settlement negotiations. Id.
190. Id. (explaining that, where serious injuries are sustained by accident victims, it is crucial
to quickly assemble evidence and not to engage in evidentiary discussions with investigators for
opposing parties).
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B. Lawyers Should Be Treated Like Other Professionals
It is apparent from the decision in Went For It that the Court now
intends to hold lawyers to a higher standard than other professionals
in the advertising arena. In Ibanez v. Florida Department of Business &
Professional Regulation9' and Edenfield, the two commercial speech
cases preceding Went For It, the Court rigorously applied the Central
Hudson test in striking down restrictions on speech." 2 In both
Ibanez and Edenfield, the Court emphasized the constitutional value of
commercial speech and the heavy burden on the government to
satisfy the Central Hudson test 9 3 In Went For It, however, the Court
circumscribes the constitutional value of commercial speech by
reducing the First Amendment protection afforded to legal advertis-
ing.
While the Court has employed the Central Hudson test in all
commercial speech cases since 1980, in Went For It, the Court applied
the test less rigorously than it has before. To satisfy the second prong
of the Central Hudson test, the state must show that the restriction
seeks to eliminate real dangers and advances the state's interest in a
"direct and material way."'" But in Went For It, the Court allowed
Florida to satisfy this burden with insufficient evidence-an unpub-
lished study prepared by the Bar, which merely reflected the opinions
of 200 select people on attorney advertising. 5 The Florida Bar
failed to demonstrate that the ban would adequately protect the
privacy of accident victims or improve the reputation of the legal
profession.' In Shapero, Ibanez, and Edenfield, the Court correctly
191. 114 S. Ct. 2084 (1994). In Ibanez, the Florida Board of Accountancy reprimanded an
attorney for advertising that she was a Certified Public Accountant and an authorized member
of the Certified Financial Board of Standards. Ibanez v. Florida Dep't of Business & Professional
Regulation, 114 S. Ct. 2084, 2086 (1994). The Court overturned the Board's decision censuring
Ibanez, as a violation of First Amendment commercial speech protection. Id. at 2092.
192. See id. at 2088 (stating that state can restrict commercial speech only if state
demonstrates that restriction serves substantial state interest and restriction is no more extensive
than necessary); Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 767 (1993) (stating that regulation must
advance substantial state interest and be reasonably proportional to that interest); see also Media
Institute Brief, supra note 96, at 8 (commenting that in past two years, Court has strictly applied
Central Hudson test in cases involving advertising by professionals). Neither Ibanez or Edenfleld
are cited in Petitioner's Brief.
193. See Ibanez, 114 S. Ct. at 2089 (recognizing that state's burden in justifying restriction on
speech is not slight).
194. Went For 1, 115 S. Ct. at 2383-84 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (citing Edenfied, 507 U.S. at
770).
195. See id. at 2384 (KennedyJ., dissenting) (asserting that Bar's study is based on pages of
self-serving statements by state). The state needs to offer more evidence when regulating
truthful and non-deceptive speech. Id.
196. Id. at 2382-83 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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concluded that the State did not meet its burden under Central
Hudson. By upholding Florida's restriction, the Court diminishes the
Central Hudson standard, and gives states more latitude in regulating
commercial speech.
States have a legitimate interest in regulating commercial speech
that is misleading and deceptive.197 The right to advertise is not
absolute and states should use their regulatory powers to protect
consumers from non-truthful advertisements.1 8  States also have a
strong interest in maintaining the privacy and tranquility of their
citizens.19 When lawyers seek to invade the privacy of accident
victims through in-person solicitation, as in Ohralik, states have
appropriately regulated this behavior. In Went For It, however, a
clearly marked advertisement provided information to accident victims
about the availability of legal services. Informative advertisements do
not merit the same regulation as in-person solicitation.
The dissemination of truthful information is constitutionally
protected commercial speech."°  "[U]nder the First Amendment,
the public, not the State, has the right and the power to decide what
ideas and information are deserving of their adherence."201 The
Court should not permit states to predetermine the information that
is available. 2
Perhaps lawyers should be held to a higher standard than other
professionals because lawyers are officers of the court and have a duty
not only to their clients, but to the public.0 3 Unlike many other
professions, a specific code of conduct prescribes a lawyer's ac-
tions.2°4 Lawyers may have a greater responsibility than other
197. EdwardJ. Eberle, Practical Reason: The Commercial Speech Paradigm, 42 CASE W. RES. L.
REv. 411, 471 (1991) (stating that commercial speech is second-order category of speech that
states have strong interest in regulating so that when false and misleading aspects are removed,
this speech will be less likely to pose harm).
198. See Natalie Abrams, Note, The Sham Exception to the Noerr-Pennington Doctrine: A
Commercial Speech Exception, 49 BROOK. L. REv. 573, 588 (1988) (discussing early lawyer
solicitation cases and stating that First Amendment protection is limited to protecting truthful
commercial speech).
199. Carolyn Doozan Cowan, Frisby v. Schultz: Were Do the Picketers Go Now? 'We'll Just
Have to Wait and See, 11 GEO. MASON U. L. REv. 227, 231 (1989) (explaining that individual
states are charged with obligation to protect citizen's right to be let alone).
200. Abrams, supra note 198, at 588.
201. Went For It, 115 S. Ct. at 2386 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
202. 1d
203. See Media Institute Brief, supra note 96, at 22 (detailing petitioner's daim that states
have special interest in advertising by lawyers because of their "public function" and that lawyers
relinquish their right to commercial speech in exchange for privilege of servingjudicial system).
204. See generally MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILrI (1980) (providing ethical
standards for attorneys and describing specific code of conduct).
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professionals because their work is essential to the fair administration
of justice.205
It is ironic that in Went For It, the Florida Bar suppressed informa-
tion about the legal system to improve the public image of lawyers.
This logic is counterintuitive. To promote the legal system, or any
service, consumers should be given more information, not less. When
states restrict the amount of information given to consumers, options
become more limited. Ultimately, this will make the marketplace less
competitive because fewer attorneys will be permitted to compete for
the market of legal service consumers. Under the Florida Bar rule,
accident victims and their families are potentially at a disadvantage
because a large segment of the legal profession cannot contact them
for thirty days.
C. Recommendations
Florida has a number of alternatives that would better achieve its
goal in a manner more consistent with the Central Hudson test. One
option would be to allow accident victims a reasonable period of time
to void an attorney agreement solicited shortly after an accident."'
This option would advance Florida's interest in assuring that vulnera-
ble accident victims, whose judgment might be impaired, are not
exploited. It would also give accident victims time to explore the
options available to them before retaining counsel. Further, replacing
a thirty-day ban on solicitation with a provision allowing the client to
void the agreement would serve both parties' interests. This alterna-
tive would allow a victim's attorney to conduct a prompt investigation
of the accident and preserve any crucial evidence. In many instances,
an immediate inspection of the accident scene will enhance claims
that are later filed by accident victims. 07
Another alternative is to limit the ban to potential wrongful death
claimants.2" To fully protect victims and their families, however, a
more limited ban on direct mail should apply to defense lawyers,
insurance adjusters, and agents, not only to attorneys seeking to
205. See Richardson, supra note 1, at 38 (observing that Florida Bar suggested that lawyers
are different from other professionals because their work is essential to fair administration of
justice).
206. See Public Citizen Brief, supra note 114, at 9 (suggesting that voidable agreement would
serve as viable alternative to existing 30-day ban on solicitation).
207. See Went For I4 115 S. Ct. at 2381 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (maintaining that it is often
necessary to investigate accident immediately to identify witnesses and preserve evidence).
208. See Public Citizen Brief, supra note 114, at 10 (arguing for narrow application of ban
to preclude solicitation only in wrongful death cases, thereby remedying ban's unjustifiably
broad sweep).
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represent accident victims." 9 Limiting the restriction to wrongful
death cases would protect the most vulnerable victims and fami-
lies-those who are most likely to suffer emotional trauma after an
accident. Victims whose injuries are less serious do not warrant
special protection by the state from direct-mail solicitation. Unlike
the ban at issue, this alternative ban would more directly serve
Florida's intended goal of protecting the privacy interests of its
citizens.
The Florida Bar should consider investing more resources to
educate the public about access to the legal system. The Bar could
set up training sessions or send literature to people describing legal
options available to them in certain situations. Broadcasting public
service advertisements on radio and television is another way to reach
a large segment of the population. A well apprised citizenry can
make informed decisions. This will improve the efficiency of the
justice system and enhance the reputation of the legal profession.
CONCLUSION
The recent decision in F/orida Bar v. Went For It, Inc. indicates that
the Supreme Court is more willing to exact a higher level of scrutiny
on legal advertising than on other forms of commercial speech. Most
states now have some form of restriction on lawyer solicitation. Went
For It will give state and local bar associations more leverage to
regulate legal advertising. Before using this authority to implement
more restrictions, states should consider whether the regulation really
protects the privacy of accident victims and their families.
209. A state bar association, however, does not have the authority to regulate insurance
companies. Therefore, the body that governs insurance companies must regulate independently
insurance agents who negotiate with accident victims.
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